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COMMENT 
THE INABILITY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY TO PROTECT THE NEW 
FASHION DESIGNER: WHY THE ID3PA 
SHOULD BE ADOPTED 
JESSICA ROSEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Piracy can wipe out young careers in a single season. The most 
severe damage from lack of protection falls upon emerging designers . . . 
who everyday lose orders and potentially our entire businesses. While 
salvage designers and large corporations with wide recognized 
trademarks can better afford to absorb these losses caused by copying, 
very few small businesses can compete with those who steal their 
intellectual capital. It makes it harder for young designers to start up 
their own companies. And isn’t that the American Dream?1 
 
In September 2011, fashion blogs blew up in outrage over a pop 
star’s “blatant copy” of a new designer’s “Puff Ball” fashion design.2  
  * J.D. Candidate, 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law; B.A. History, 2007, 
University of California, San Diego.  I would like to thank Professor William Gallagher for the many 
meetings, comments, and critiques.  I would also like to thank my friends in and out of law school 
for listening to me talk for endless hours on this subject.  Finally, I want to thank my family, 
especially my mother Sandra Decker and sister Elyssa Rosen for reading what they thought would 
be a boring legal paper, but what ultimately became an interesting, and at times, compelling read. 
 1 Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing on H.R. 2511 Before 
the H. Subcommittee on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet, 112th Cong. 4-5 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2511] (statement of Lazaro Hernandez, designer and cofounder of 
Proenza Schouler). 
 2 Hayley Phelan, Adventures in Copyright: Nicki Minaj Wears a Blatant Copy of Young 
Designer Jessica Rogers’ “Puff Ball” Fashion; Rogers Says She Was “in Tears” over It, 
FASHIONISTA (Sept. 14, 2011), www.fashionista.com/2011/09/adventures-in-copyright-nicki-minaj-
1
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The new designer, 21-year-old Jessica Rogers, saw a blog post about 
singer Nicki Minaj attending Carolina Herrera’s Spring 2012 fashion 
runway show.3  As Rogers read the post and studied the accompanying 
photo, she described herself as “immediately caught off guard” because 
the dress Minaj wore resembled her own fashion design.4  She put “time, 
money, sweat, all of [herself] into [her] work,” only to see Minaj in a 
copy.5 
Rogers explains that she conceived the “Puff Ball” design three 
years earlier and worked extremely hard to make it her signature.6  She 
“developed contacts all through the industry and [had her] garments 
waiting to be worn.”7  A year and a half earlier she had been contacted 
by Minaj’s stylists, who requested her garments for future press events.8  
After numerous attempts to reach Minaj’s stylists, Rogers decided to 
send photos of garments from her fashion line.9  A month later, Rogers 
saw Minaj wearing her “Puff Ball” design, though she admitted, “The 
knock off doesn’t look that good.”10 
To make matters worse, Minaj was sitting next to none other than 
Anna Wintour, the Editor-in-Chief of Vogue magazine.11  Rogers was 
distraught when she saw Minaj sitting next to Wintour wearing a copy of 
her design, because Wintour is “one of [her] personal icons and someone 
that [she] admired,” someone she hoped “would see [her] garments . . . 
as a completely original idea.”12  Minaj’s “blatant copy” may very well 
wears-a-blatant-rip-off-of-young-designer-jessica-rogers-puff-ball-fashion-rogers-says-she-was-in-
tears/; Nicki Minaj Is Accussed [sic] of Copying a Clothing Design by Jessica Rogers During New 
York Fashion Week, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/09/15/nicki-minaj-is-accussed-o_n_964804.html; Ella Brodskaya, Puff Ball Pitfall for Nicki 
Minaj, NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL FOR FASHION LAW (Sept. 23, 2011), www.caseclothesed. 
com/puff-ball-pitfall-for-nicki-minaj/; Bernice Lee McMillan, Nicki Minaj Accused of Stealing 
Budding Designer’s Idea, STYLE BISTRO (Sept. 14, 2011), www.stylebistro.com/New+York+ 
Fashion+Week/articles/mYrwNz0obsZ/Nicki+Minaj+Accused+Stealing+Budding+Designer; Young 
Designer Claims Nicki Minaj Copied Her Designs for That Colorful Top, GLAMOUR VANITY (Sept. 
16, 2011), www.glamourvanity.com/celebrities/young-designer-claims-nicki-minaj-copied-her-
designs-for-that-colorful-top/. 
 3 Jessica Rogers, Artistic Plagiarism, SOME DAY NEW YORKER BLOG (Sept. 13, 2011), 
somedaynewyorker.blogspot.com/2011/09/artistic-plagiarism.html. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Nicki Minaj Is Accussed [sic] of Copying a Clothing Design by Jessica Rogers During 
New York Fashion Week, supra note 2. 
 12 Rogers, supra note 3. 
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have dashed those hopes.  She thought, “How could someone copy my 
work”?13 
According to legal scholars Kal Raustiala and Christopher 
Sprigman, the copying of another’s fashion design is only natural in the 
fashion industry; it is simply how the fashion industry works: 
Fashion piracy may be parasitic on original designs, but it is a parasite 
that does not kill its host: though it may weaken individual designers it 
also, paradoxically, strengthens the industry and drives its evolution.  
In an industry that cannot look to continuous improvements in quality 
to drive demand, piracy substitutes for functional innovation. This is a 
very important point: piracy is the fashion industry’s equivalent of the 
new feature on a cell phone.  It is a force that encourages a consumer 
to discard a perfectly serviceable garment and purchase the new, new 
thing.14 
For Raustiala and Sprigman, the host in the “parasite” metaphor is not 
the individual designer, but the fashion industry itself.15 
While the parasite is not killing its host, it may very well kill new 
fashion designers, those who “are creating and . . . bringing freshness and 
newness to middle America.  They are inspiring [the] bigger companies 
to do new things and think of things, and think of our work 
differently.”16  New designers who are, in Rogers’s words, putting “time, 
money, sweat, all of themselves into their work,” find themselves in 
situations where designs are copied, and there is nothing they can do 
about it.17  Moreover, Susan Scafidi, Director of the Fashion Law 
Institute at Fordham University School of Law, notes that “[i]ndividuals 
are the industry and it is a loss of human capital and a personal tragedy 
when designers are driven out of business because they are copie 18
 13 Id.; see Jason Linkins, Urban Outfitters Continues Their Grand Tradition of Ripping Off 
Designers, HUFFINGTON POST, www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/26/urban-outfitters-steal_n_ 
867604.html (last updated July 26, 2011). 
 14 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
1201, 1209 (2009) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, The Paradox Piracy Revisited]; see Kal 
Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy 
Paradox]. 
 15 See Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 14. 
 16 Design Law—Are Special Provisions Needed To Protect Unique Industries?: Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop., 110th Cong. 56 (2011) 
[hereinafter Design Law Hearing] (statement of Narciso Rodriguez, Designer, on behalf of the 
Council of Fashion Designers of America) (expressing the need for legislation to protect new fashion 
designers). 
 17 Rogers, supra note 3. 
 18 See A Bill To Provide Protection for Fashion Design: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the H. 
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop., 109th Cong. 187 (2006) [hereinafter 
3
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As the law stands today, fashion designs are not afforded copyright 
protection, because clothing is deemed a useful article.19  Useful articles 
“are largely unprotected by the Copyright Act, except to the extent that 
they ‘incorporate[ ] pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, 
the utilitarian aspects of the article.’”20  Under “separate conceptualism,” 
in which the artistic element is conceptually severable from the useful 
aspect of the article rather than inextricably interwoven with its utility,21 
it has proven difficult to truly separate the artistic or creative features 
from the utilitarian function of clothing.22  One court stated that 
“separable elements of clothing, to the extent that they exist, may be 
eligible for copyright protection.”23  However, the Copyright Office 
“generally refuse[s] to register claims to copyright in three-dimensional 
aspects of clothing.”24 
Nevertheless, the fashion world is fighting back.  Organizations like 
the Council of Fashion Designers of America and American Apparel and 
Footwear Association have lobbied Congress to amend the Copyright 
Act in order to provide copyright protection to fashion designs.25  In the 
112th Congress, both houses introduced bills to afford copyright 
protection to fashion designs.26  On July 13, 2011, Representative Bob 
Goodlatte reintroduced the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy 
Hearing on H.R. 5055] (statement of Susan Scafidi, Visiting Professor, Fordham Law School, 
Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University). 
 19 Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing 
Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 
321 U.S. 457 (1941)). 
 20 Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Cinderella Divine, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(emphasis added). 
 21 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 22 Hearing on H.R. 5055, supra note 18, at 3 (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, 
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Current copyright law only provides protection to those 
design elements of a useful article that are separable and independent of the utilitarian function of 
the article. Therefore, fashion works have traditionally been denied copyright protection on the 
ground that they are considered to be useful articles.”); see also JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., COPYRIGHT 
LAW IN BUSINESS AND PRACTICE § 2:37 (Rev. ed. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he idea that clothing 
might be copyrighted–apart from any copyrightable designs that may be placed on it–suffers from 
the strict rule established in such cases as Whimsicality, 891 F.2d 452). 
 23 Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
added). 
 24 Jovani Fashion, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (emphasis added) (citing United States Copyright 
Office Policy Decision: Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,531 (1991)). 
 25 Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez, designer and 
cofounder of Proenza Schouler); id. at 91 (statement of Kurt Courtney, Manager, Government 
Relations, American Apparel & Footwear Association). 
 26 Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Congress (2012). 
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Prevention Act (ID3PA), a virtual copy of the Senate’s bill introduced in 
the 111th Congress.27  And on September 10, 2012, Senator Charles 
Schumer introduced the Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012 
(IDPA), a bill that followed earlier bills but added limitations in gaining 
copyright protection—notably the bill would have imposed a notice 
period as a prerequisite for bringing a cause of action.28  Although both 
bills died in the 112th Congress,29 the lively history and recent focus on 
expanding copyright protection to cover fashion designers suggest such 
protection is a realistic possibility in the near future. 
The reintroduction of ID3PA and the introduction of IDPA mark the 
sixth and seventh attempts in the last six years to provide copyright 
protection for fashion designs.  In 2006, members of the House 
introduced “A Bill To Provide Protection for Fashion Design.”30  From 
2007 to 2009, members of both the Senate and the House introduced 
three bills known as the Design Piracy Prohibition Act.31  All of these 
bills died in committee.32  Yet, in 2010 the Senate introduced the original 
ID3PA, which moved further along than the prior bills.33  The original 
ID3PA was deemed a “more targeted bill” than its predecessors in 
protecting original fashion designs while not increasing litigation 
throughout the fashion industry.34  The bill was unanimously approved 
and reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee on December 1, 2010.35  
 27 H.R. 2511; Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
 28 S. 3523; S. REP. NO. 112-259, at 2 (2012), available at 2012 WL 6725915 (Westlaw); 
“Executive Business Meeting”: Hearing on H.R. 2471, S. 3486, S. 1894, S. 3250, S. 3523 Before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Sept. 20, 2012 at 10:00 AM, available at www.judiciary.senate.gov 
/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3fd304c9f884bebd65a28be7fcab7241 [hereinafter Executive Business 
Meeting]. 
 29 H.R. 2511 (112th): Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, 
GOVTRACK.US, www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2511 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) [hereinafter 
GOVTRACK.US H.R. 2511]; S. 3523 (112th): Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, 
GOVTRACK.US, www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3523 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) [hereinafter 
GOVTRACK.US S. 3523]. 
 30 A Bill To Provide Protection for Fashion Design, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 31 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1957, 110th Cong. 
(2007); H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 32 H.R. 2033 (110th): Design Piracy Prohibition Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr2033 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013); S. 1957 (110th): Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act, GOVTRACK.US, www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s1957 (last visited Mar. 
13, 2013); H.R. 2196 (111th): Design Piracy Prohibition Act, GOVTRACK.US, www.govtrack.us 
/congress/bills/111/hr2196 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
 33 GOVTRACK.US H.R. 2511, supra note 29. 
 34 Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 1, at 91 (statement of Kurt Courtney, Manager, 
Government Relations, American Apparel & Footwear Association). 
 35 S. 3728 (111th): Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-3728 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) [hereinafter 
GOVTRACK.US S. 3728]; see also Tiffany W. Shimada, Fashion Design Under the Innovative Design 
5
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However, neither house of Congress voted on the bill before the 
adjournment of the 111th Congress later that month, resulting in the 
death of the ID3PA.36 
The history of prior bills to afford copyright protection to fashion 
designers, along with the recent introduction of the ID3PA and the IDPA 
in the 112th Congress, suggest that new fashion designers who face the 
threat of ruin once their designs are copied may one day receive legal 
protection for their designs.37  Being a new designer in the fashion 
industry generally carries a certain vulnerability, or more appropriately, 
helplessness.38  New designers are not necessarily more vulnerable to 
design-copying than well-known designers; rather, new designers are 
helpless because they typically lack other intellectual property 
protections that well-known designers have, such as trademark, trade 
dress, or design patents.39  Consequently, a new designer’s lack of 
protection makes her or him considerably more vulnerable to complete 
ruin when her or his design is copied.40  Without intellectual property 
protection, new fashion designers may become dissuaded from 
participating in the innovation and creation of fashion that can inspire the 
bigger fashion houses in innovation and creation of new fashion trends.41  
Therefore, a bill to provide copyright protection for the new fashion 
designer must be adopted because lack of copyright protection impacts 
the fashion industry as a whole.  Without such protection, perhaps the 
parasite will kill its host after all.42 
This Comment argues that Congress should adopt legislation that 
affords copyright protection to new fashion designers.  The present state 
of the intellectual property regime leaves a new designer without any 
legal protection against blatant copying and can easily result in the 
designer’s business demise.  Part I of this Comment provides a brief 
background of copyright law, as well as other doctrines of intellectual 
Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, INTELL. PROP. LITIG. (Spring 2011), available at 
www.brinkshofer.com/files/fashion_designshimadaaba_ip_newsletterspring2011.pdf. 
 36 GOVTRACK.US S. 3728, supra note 35. 
 37 See generally Hearing on H.R. 2511 supra note 1, at 91 (statement of Kurt Courtney, 
Manager, Government Relations, American Apparel & Footwear Association) (dismissing 
misconceptions that surrounded prior proposed legislation to afford copyright protection to fashion 
design). 
 38 See id. at 4-5 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez, designer and cofounder of Proenza 
Schouler). 
 39 See id. 
 40 C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2009). 
 41 Design Law Hearing, supra note 16, at 56 (statement of Narciso Rodriguez, Designer, on 
behalf of the Council of Fashion Designers of America). 
 42 See Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, supra note 14, at 1209. 
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property law, and the limited protection these doctrines provide for 
fashion designs.  Part I also explains how the limited protections afforded 
to fashion designs vis-à-vis intellectual property law are rarely, if ever, 
applicable to the new designer.  Part II provides a more thorough history 
of the predecessor bills discussed above, including the recent ID3PA and 
IDPA, and explains why the IDPA ignores the needs of the new fashion 
designer.  Part III claims that common arguments by those against the 
adoption of the ID3PA and future proposed legislation, including 
increased and frivolous litigation, are unwarranted.  Ultimately, the 
enactment of the ID3PA or similar legislation would ensure a level 
playing field for new designers and the possibility that they too can 
realize the American Dream. 
I.  THE LIMITED PROTECTION OF FASHION DESIGN UNDER THE 
PRESENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
Utility guides what may or may not be afforded intellectual property 
protection.  Copyright and trademark laws prevent protection to anything 
“useful,” while patent law endorses utility so long as the thing to be 
patented is novel and nonobvious.  The problem with clothing is that it is 
useful,43 yet clothing is rarely seen as novel or nonobvious.  We see 
clothing as a necessity—there are only so many different ways in which 
a person can design a shirt, a dress, or pair of slacks.  While some 
fashion designers, primarily well-known fashion houses, rely on 
particular aspects of intellectual property for legal protection, such as 
trademark and trade dress, and to a certain extent design patents, new 
designers generally cannot find the same relief.44 
A. COPYRIGHT 
The Constitution empowers Congress to establish copyrights in 
order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”45  Due to the broad constitutional 
authorization handed to Congress in establishing copyrights, federal 
copyright law is “purely statutory,”46 codified in Title 17 of the United 
 43 Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing 
Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 
321 U.S. 457 (1941)). 
 44 Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 1, at 4-5 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez, designer and 
cofounder of Proenza Schouler). 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 46 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:1 (2011). 
7
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States Code.47  Congress enacted the most current version of the 
Copyright Act in 1976, and it is the main source of copyright law 
today.48  The Copyright Act defines “works of authorship” that are 
protected by copyright as literary works, musical works, dramatic works, 
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sounds recordings, 
and architectural works.49  To qualify as a “work of authorship” and 
therefore warrant copyright protection, a work must fall into one of the 
foregoing categories.50  Congress further delineated these categories by 
explaining that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the 
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”51  Fashion design does not fit neatly into any of the enumerated 
categories and could arguably be considered an “idea” or a “concept.”52  
Nevertheless, the true threat to fashion design is the Copyright Act’s 
disapproval of “useful articles.”53 
In enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress determined that a 
useful article—for the purposes of this Comment, fashion design and the 
garment itself—could fall under the category of “pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works”: 
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-dimensional 
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, 
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, 
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural 
plans.  Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship 
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, 
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and 
only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are 
 47 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (Westlaw 2012). 
 48 Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). 
 49 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
 50 Id. 
 51 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (Westlaw 2012). 
 52 See generally Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 53 See id. at 455. 
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capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.54 
However, relevant case law and recent legal debate on the issue 
have revealed that it is highly unlikely that the fashion design seeking 
copyright can truly be identified as conceptually separate from its 
utilitarian aspects as an article of clothing, and therefore it cannot be 
afforded copyright protection.55  Although one court recently stated, 
“Painting and fashion design stem from related creative stock, and thus 
share many central features,”56 ultimately the law is clear regarding 
clothing: copyright does not protect fashion design.  In Whimsicality, Inc. 
v. Rubie’s Costume Co., the Second Circuit concluded, “Clothes are 
particularly unlikely to meet [conceptual separability]—the very 
decorative elements that stand out being intrinsic to the decorative 
function of the clothing.”57  John W. Hazard, Jr., explains, “The idea that 
clothing might be copyrighted . . . suffers from the strict rule 
established” under Whimsicality.58 
This does not mean fashion designers have sat idly by prior to the 
recent introduction of bills to afford copyright protection to fashion 
design.  Raustiala and Sprigman suggest that fashion designers have 
participated in “the copying free-for-all” the past six decades while 
making meager proposals for expanded legal protection.59  However, 
Louis Altman and Malla Pollack shed light on a history in which fashion 
designers and manufacturers of apparel played a role in proposing 
several bills to protect fashion design before Congress, with a few 
achieving modest success.60  For example, in 1963 the Senate passed S. 
 54 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (Westlaw 2013); see Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 
2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). 
 55 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:62 (4th ed. 2011). 
 56 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint 
Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).  Though this case dealt with whether a 
fashion designer registered a valid trademark under the Lanham Act, the court’s comparison of 
fashion and art nonetheless may apply to an analysis of what “works of authorship” fall under 
copyright protection. 
 57 Whimsicality, 891 F.2d at 455 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (citing Fashion Originators 
Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 321 U.S. 457 (1941)). 
For a more detailed discussion of the problem with conceptual separatism and fashion design, see 
Lisa J. Hedrick, Note, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the Seams, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 215, 229 (2008). 
 58 HAZARD, supra note 22, at § 2:37. 
 59 Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 14, at 1698-99. 
 60 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 55, at § 4:62, fn. 22; see Emma Yao Xiao, Note, The 
New Trend: Protecting American Fashion Designs Through National Copyright Measures, 28 
9
Rosen: ID3PA
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
336 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
 
776, a bill that afforded copyright protection to fashion designs.61  The 
bill did not reach a vote in the House and died in the House Judiciary 
Committee.62  Also, the proposed Copyright Act of 1976 incorporated a 
chapter on design protection. 63  However, shortly before final passage, 
the chapter was excluded prior to the Copyright Act becoming law.64  
That chapter was later reintroduced but did not pass.65 
Under the Copyright Act, design protection occurs gradually, 
protecting only specified designs.  Congress has either amended the 
Copyright Act itself to define a particular “useful article” as a “work of 
authorship,” as in the case of architectural design, or has added chapters 
to Title 17 to prescribe sui generis form of protection for specific 
industry designs, such as vessel hulls and semiconductor chips.66  Sui 
generis protection is “absolutely distinct from the rest of the Copyright 
Act”67 and defines in detail the protection afforded and remedies 
available.68  Notably, when Congress enacted the Vessel Hull Design 
Protection Act (VHDPA) in 1998, a sui generis form of industrial design 
protection, Congress elected to name the added chapter under Title 17 
“Designs Protected.”69  At the moment, “Designs Protected” covers only 
vessel hull designs, but recent proposed legislation to afford copyright 
protection to fashion design sought to amend “Designs Protected” by 
including fashion design.   It is likely Congress will once more 70
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417, 432 (“Since 1914, Congress has considered more than seventy bills 
that would provide copyright protection to fashion design, but none have been successful.”). 
 61 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 55, at § 4:62, fn. 22. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 THE VESSEL HULL DESIGN PROTECTION ACT: OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (Nov. 2003) 
www.copyright.gov/reports/vhdpa-report.pdf; see Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra 
note 14, at 1749-54 (discussing the expansion of copyright protection since the enactment of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 for architectural design, semiconductors and boat hulls); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) defines “sui generis” as “[o]f its own kind or class; unique or peculiar,” 
and says “[t]he term is used in intellectual-property law to describe a regime designed to protect 
rights that fall outside the traditional patent, trademark, copyright, and trade-secret doctrines. For 
example, a database may not be protected by copyright law if its content is not original, but it could 
be protected by a sui generis statute designed for that purpose.”. 
 67 David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1328 
(2004); see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing 
the legislative history of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, a form of sui generis design 
protection, and explaining that Congress adopted a separate statute in order to afford copyright 
protection for semiconductor chips rather than amend the Copyright Act, because semiconductor 
chips are “intrinsically utilitarian articles” and thus not protected under traditional copyright law). 
 68 See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1332 (Westlaw 2012). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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introduce legislation, which again will seek to amend “Designs 
Protected” in order to extend copyright protection to fashion design. 
B. TRADEMARK & TRADE DRESS 
Many well-known fashion designers utilize trademark law in order 
to directly protect their products and, indirectly, the designs 
themselves.71  Federal trademark law is governed by the Lanham Act.72  
The Lanham Act defines subject matter eligible for trademark as “any 
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a 
person.” 73  The purpose of trademark is “to identify and distinguish . . . 
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured and sold by 
others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is 
unknown.” 74  A limitation, however, is that the purported trademark may 
not be utilitarian or aesthetically functional.75 
In fashion, trademark use is generally the placement of a mark that 
is distinctive, arbitrary, and non-functional on the three-dimensional 
work itself,76 such as the popular Louis Vuitton “LV” logo, which is 
printed consistently on its bags.77  Recently, the Second Circuit 
determined a color can be a trademark in the realm of fashion design if 
the color has acquired secondary meaning and would not be barred by 
the doctrine of aesthetic functionality.78  In Christian Louboutin S.A. v. 
Yves Saint Laurent American Holdings, Inc., the court found the red sole 
of Louboutin’s shoes acted as a trademark so long as the red sole had 
acquired secondary meaning, which “occurs when, ‘in the minds of the 
 71 Kevin V. Tu, Counterfeit Fashion: The Interplay Between Copyright and Trademark Law 
in Original Fashion Designs and Designer Knockoffs, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 419, 430-32 
(2010). 
 72 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 450 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint 
Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 73 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (Westlaw 2012). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 219 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (“[T]wo forms of the functionality doctrine are relevant to us today: ‘traditional’ or 
‘utilitarian’ functionality, and ‘aesthetic’ functionality. Both forms serve as an affirmative defense to 
a trademark infringement claim.”). 
 76 Id. at 222 (“On the one hand, where an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and 
trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of adequate 
alternative designs, the aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such protection.  But on the other 
hand, distinctive and arbitrary arrangements of predominantly ornamental features that do not hinder 
potential competitors from entering the same market with differently dressed versions of the product 
are non-functional, and are hence eligible for trademark protection.” (internal quotation marks, 
brackets, and citations omitted)). 
 77 See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 78 See Christian Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 206. 
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public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of 
the product rather than the product itself.’”79  The court further found the 
red sole, in limited use, had no utilitarian function, nor was it 
aesthetically functional, and was protectable because “the aesthetic 
design of [the] product is itself the mark for which protection is sought,” 
and providing the mark-holder exclusive use would not “put competitors 
at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”80  In Louboutin, the 
court concluded that Louboutin’s registered red sole mark was a valid 
trademark when placed in contrast to the upper part of the shoe, but when 
used monochromatically—where the sole and upper part of the shoe are 
the same color—the court found Louboutin failed to show sufficient 
secondary meaning.81 
Another means of intellectual property protection for fashion 
designers is trade dress, by which the three-dimensional work alone has 
acquired secondary meaning.82  Trade dress, as with trademark, does not 
protect the design itself, but rather protects the overall appearance that 
functions as a source–indicator in order to prevent consumer confusion.83  
For example, Harvard Law Professor Jeannie Suk explains “the Burberry 
plaid design is legally protected because it identifies Burberry, while the 
design of a dress the plaid may adorn is not, no matter how artful or 
original.”84  Moreover, purse manufacturers have found protection under 
trade dress when “the product’s appearance has acquired secondary 
meaning . . . [such] that purchasers are likely to confuse the imitating 
goods with the originals.”85  However, it is unlikely that a new designer 
entering the fashion industry can overcome secondary meaning when 
seeking either trademark or trade dress protection since she or he is new 
to the industry and attempting to make her or his design known.86 
 79 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (quoting Inwood Labs., 
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)). 
 80 Christian Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 219-20 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 81 Id. at 224-28; see also Theodore C. Max, Coloring Outside the Lines in the Name of 
Aesthetic Functionality: Qualitex, Louboutin, and How the Second Circuit Saved Color Marks for 
Fashion, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 1081 (2012). 
 82 Jeannie Suk, Little Red (Litigious) Shoes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, at SR14, available at 
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/louboutin-and-the-little-red-litigious-shoes. 
html?_r=1; see Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 216. 
 83 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 209-10. 
 84 Suk, supra note 82. 
 85 Coach Leatherware Co., Inc. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir 1991). 
 86 Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 1, at 14 (statement of Jeannie Suk, Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law School) (“Emerging designers do not have the advantages [of trademark law] . . . . 
Their products are not well enough recognized to qualify for trademark or trade dress protection, nor 
do they have the money to advertise and reinforce their brand image.”). 
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Moreover, as in copyright law, fashion designs (or portions of 
designs) are not protectable under trademark or trade dress because they 
are generally seen as functional.87  The Supreme Court in Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Products Co. explained, “If a product’s functional features 
could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features 
could be obtained.”88  For this reason, it is doubtful any article of 
clothing—although it might be known to the common consumer that it 
comes from a particular fashion designer—would be able to acquire 
trademark or trade dress protection unless there is something more to the 
appearance than what is deemed functional.89 
C. PATENTS 
Patent law, unlike copyright and trademark laws, provides 
protection for a “useful article” as long as it is novel and nonobvious.90  
Fashion designers may find protection by obtaining either utility patents 
or design patents.91  The main distinction between utility and design 
patents is that utility patents protect new and useful articles, while design 
patents protect “new, original, and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture.”92  Moreover, the design cannot be “dictated solely by 
considerations of function.”93  In order to acquire a valid patent under 
either category, the fashion designer must show the design is novel and 
nonobvious.   However, overcoming the nonobvious requirement can be 
extremely difficult, for the new and the well-known fashion designer 
alike. 
94
In determining nonobviousness for an article of clothing, a court 
applies a test to determine “whether the design would be obvious to a 
skilled dressmaker ‘who has, or is chargeable with, knowledge of the 
 87 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. 
Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 88 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995). 
 89 Christian Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (explaining that although the court found the red 
sole of the Louboutin Shoe to have secondary meaning, ultimately the court could not separate the 
functionality from the sole itself). 
 90 Anne Theodore Briggs, Hung Out To Dry: Clothing Design Protection Pitfalls in United 
States Law, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 169, 171 (2002). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Patents, USPTO.GOV, www.uspto.gov/patents/index.jsp (last modified Jan. 26, 2012). 
 93 Briggs, supra note 90, at 172, 176. 
 94 There are different eligibility requirements for utility patents and design patents, but 
originality, novelty, and nonobviousness apply to both.  For the purpose of this Comment, it is 
unnecessary to go in depth into patents.  For a more detailed analysis, see Briggs, supra note 90, at 
172, 175. 
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prior art.’”95  If the fashion design is “new and pleasing enough to catch 
the trade, but [does] not reflect such exceptional talent beyond the skill 
of the ordinary designer” who is familiar with the prior art, a court will 
determine that the design does not merit design patent protection.96  As 
Anne Theodore Briggs explains, “[T]he nonobviousness standard is so 
demanding that even new clothing designs that do not incorporate any 
known design elements can still fail to qualify for design patent 
protection.”97 
Nevertheless, assuming a new designer may overcome the 
demanding requirements of patent eligibility, the process of registering 
also hinders the fashion designer.  Acquiring a valid patent requires time 
and money, which is arguably a significant barrier in obtaining patent 
protection for fashion designs.98  As of December 2012, the patent 
registration process ranges from 19.6 months for the First Office Action 
Pendency—from the date of filing an application to the date of first 
action by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)—and 
the total pendency in registering a patent is an average of 31.7 months.99  
Given the short span of a fashion season, trend, or fad, the designer will 
not obtain a patent until after the lifespan of the design itself.100  
USPTO’s goal is to reduce these times to an average of twenty months 
for total pendency by 2015.101  However, a waiting period of twenty 
months is still unlikely to benefit fashion designers.102 
 95 Briggs, supra note 90, at 176 (“The judiciary developed this standard to set a very high bar 
for new designs.” (citing Neufeld-Furst & Co. v. Jay-Day Frocks Inc., 112 F.2d 715, 716 (2d Cir. 
1940) (per curiam)). 
 96 Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. Olga Co., 510 F.2d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 1975) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see Tourneau v. Tishman & Lipp, 119 F. Supp. 593, 596-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (“It is 
not sufficient that the design be novel, ornamental, or pleasing to the eye. The conception of the 
design must require some exceptional talent beyond the range of the ordinary designer familiar with 
the prior art.  An unstartling regrouping of old elements in a design patent which does not rise above 
the commonplace or demonstrate originality which is born of the inventive faculty may not be called 
‘invention’ for the purposes of patent validity.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 97 Briggs, supra note 90, at 177. 
 98 Hedrick, supra note 57, at 224. 
 99 Compare Data Visualization Center, USPTO.GOV, www.uspto.gov/dashboards/ 
patents/main.dashxml (last visited Jan. 23, 2013), with Briggs, supra note 90, at 179 (stating that in 
1997, the average pendency was 22.2 months). 
 100 See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 40, at 1153 for a discussion of fashion trends and fads. 
But see also Complaint for Patent Infringement, lululemon athletica can. Inc. v. Calvin Klein, Inc., 
2012 WL 3292844 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2012) (alleging Calvin Klein infringed lululemon’s design 
patents for yoga pants). 
 101 Data Visualization Center, supra note 99. 
 102 Briggs, supra note 90, at 179 (“With the business lifespan of the average clothing design 
lasting only one season (a few months to a year at most) design patent protection would come far too 
late to be of much value.”). 
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D. THE NEW FASHION DESIGNER UNDER THE CURRENT 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
New fashion designers have little, if any, intellectual property 
protection afforded to their fashion designs.  While new designers can 
obtain copyright or trademark protection for some elements of the 
design, such as copyright protection for the fabric print of the article of 
clothing or placing a trademark on the design itself, the actual design of 
the garment may nevertheless be copied by anyone or any entity, and 
often there is nothing the new designer can do about it.103  Moreover, 
with the use of Internet promotion and shops,104 and online marketplaces, 
such as Etsy.com, “the homemade marketplace,”105 new designers who 
place their designs online can easily fall victim to copying. 
An example of copying a new designer from the Internet is the story 
of Stevie Koerner.  In May 2011, the Huffington Post reported that Urban 
Outfitters “ripped off” independent jewelry designer Stevie Koerner’s 
line of pendants called “A World of Love.”106  Koerner sold her jewelry 
on Etsy.com.107  She explained her “World/United States of Love” line 
was one of the reasons she could quit her full-time job and become an 
entrepreneur.108  She was devastated upon seeing pendants similar to 
hers at Urban Outfitters: “My heart sank a little bit . . . They even stole 
the item name as well as some of my copy.”109  Each pendant resembled 
a state with a small heart cut out of the pendant.110  The name of each 
state pendant is “I Heart [state name].”111  Urban Outfitters called its 
 103 A new designer can copyright the fabric print, but not the design of the garment; and of 
course, the new designer may find trademark protection in any “mark” that identifies the designer.  
See L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Dolori 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 104 See www.shopbop.com, www.bluefly.com, and www.revolveclothing.com, which are just 
a few online clothing shops that sell a number of well-known and new fashion designers’ garments. 
 105 ETSY, www.etsy.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).  The creators explain in its mission 
statement: “Etsy is the world’s handmade marketplace.  Our mission is to empower people to change 
the way the global economy works.  We see a world in which very-very small businesses have 
much-much more sway in shaping the economy, local living economies are thriving everywhere, and 
people value authorship and provenance as much as price and convenience.  We are bringing heart to 
commerce and making the world more fair, more sustainable, and more fun.”  Id. 
 106 Linkins, supra note 13. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id.; see Laura C. Marshall, Note, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should Adopt a 
Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305, 324 (2007) 
(discussing why intellectual property is appropriate in safeguarding entrepreneurs). 
 109 Linkins, supra note 13. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
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jewelry line “I Heart Destination Necklaces.”112  Urban Outfitters’s 
advertising copy, “Wear your locale love,” closely resembles Koerner’s 
copy, “Wear yo 113
The Huffington Post report cited other accounts that Urban 
Outfitters copied jewelry designs from new fashion designers and noted 
that such accusations began as early as 2006.114  Nevertheless, Urban 
Outfitters responded that a search on Etsy.com revealed numerous online 
shops selling similar “state necklaces” and that they were “not implying 
Koerner stole her necklace idea from one of these other designers,” but 
that they were “simply stating the obvious—that the idea is not unique to 
Koerner and she can in no way claim to be its originator.”115  Moreover, 
Urban Outfitters asserted that such negative media coverage threatens 
“the dozens of independent designers [they] work with on a daily 
basis.”116  Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that numerous 
accusations of “fast fashion” retailers copying independent designs117 
represents “a huge loss to small business.”118  Silvia Beltrametti explains, 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id.; Foster Kamer, Are Brooklyn Fashion Designers Being Ripped Off by Urban 
Outfitters?, VILLAGE VOICE BLOGS (May 27, 2010), blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/ 
2010/05/are_brooklyn_fa.php. 
 115 Urban Outfitters Responds to False Allegations by Necklace Designer, URBAN 
OUTFITTERS (May 28, 2011, 12:03 PM), blog.urbanoutfitters.com/blog/urban_outfitters_ 
responds_to_false_allegations_by_necklace_designer. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Hearing on H.R. 5055, supra note 18, at 78 (statement of Susan Scafidi, visiting 
Professor, Fordham Law School, Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University).  Scafidi 
gives an example of copying a new designer: “Consider the example of Ananas, a 3-year-old 
handbag label.  Its cofounder is a young wife and mother working from home, actually here in the 
Washington suburbs, and she has been successful in promoting her handbags, which retail between 
$200 and $400.  Earlier this year, however, she received a telephone call from a buyer canceling the 
wholesale order.  When she asked why, she learned that the buyer had found virtually identical bags 
in a cheaper material at a lower price.  Shortly thereafter, the same designer looked on the Internet 
and discovered a post on a message board from a potential customer who had seen one of her bags in 
a major department store, thought about buying it, but went home and on the Internet found a 
cheaper bag, a look-alike in lower-quality materials, which she not only bought but recommended to 
others.” Id.; see also Amy Odell, Forever 21’s Ability To Copy Designer Clothes Could Be in 
Jeopardy, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 13, 2009, 9:45 AM), nymag.com/daily/fashion/2009/04/ 
forever_21s_ability_to_copy_de.html.  New York Magazine labels fashion line Trovata’s status as 
“Newcomer.”  Trovata sued “fast fashion” retailer Forever 21 for copying Trovata’s clothing.  
Trovata alleged Forever 21 manufactured garments that were identical, or almost identical to those 
designed by Trovata.  Id. 
 118 Hearing on H.R. 5055, supra note 18, at 78 (2006) (statement of Susan Scafidi, visiting 
Professor, Fordham Law School, Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University). 
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“Knockoffs devalue designs to the point that wholesale orders are 
cancelled, and this is threatening for [new] designers especially.”119 
Another threat to new designers arises when they make efforts to 
promote their fashion lines, as in the case of Jessica Rogers’s Puff Ball 
top.  Of course, to a new designer, receiving a phone call from a 
publicist, stylist, or wholesale buyer can be a big deal.  It may be the start 
of getting a new designer’s name and garment out in public.  However, if 
the new designer sends samples, or sells a unit to a publicist, stylist, or 
wholesale buyer, those persons can easily copy the new designer’s 
creation.120  Jessica Rogers claimed she had been contacted by Nicki 
Minaj’s stylist, who copied her “Puff Ball” design and described her top 
as a “‘Puff Ball’ top,”121 giving Rogers no credit.122  Minaj’s image 
consultant, on the other hand, asserted that Rogers’s allegation is untrue, 
and that Minaj never contacted the designer.123 
These stories illustrate the shortfalls of our intellectual property 
regime in protecting a new designer’s interests.124  In both examples, 
fashion blog wars ignited over whether there was intentional copying.  
Urban Outfitters claimed that they did not copy Koerner, and that the 
necklaces merely follow a trend.125  Minaj claimed there was never any 
contact between her and Rogers and that Rogers “just wants 
attention.”126  Of course, those claims could be true.  And of course, the 
allegedly infringing designers may very well have independently created 
the contested designs.  But with no legal protection, these new designers 
are left without recourse; they cannot initiate suits to determine the rights 
of the parties.  Instead, they are left with “what ifs” and, perhaps on a 
 119 Silvia Beltrametti, Evaluation of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Is the Cure Worse 
than the Disease? An Analogy with Counterfeiting and a Comparison with the Protection Available 
in the European Community, 8 Nw. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 147, 163 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
 120 See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Jeannie Suk, Professor of 
Law, Harvard Law School). 
 121 Young Designer Claims Nicki Minaj Copied Her Designs for That Colorful Top, supra 
note 2. 
 122 Phelan, supra note 2. 
 123 Nicki Minaj on Copycat Rumors: That Designer Is LYING! I Don’t Even Know Her!, 
THEYBF.COM (Sept. 17, 2011), www.theybf.com/2011/09/17/nicki-minaj-on-copycat-rumors-that-
designer-is-lying-i-dont-even-know-her?page=1. 
 124 Hearing on H.R. 5055, supra note 18, at 188 (statement of Rep. Darrell Issa, Member, 
House Comm. on the Judiciary) (“I would just like to close by saying that in fact we protect 
individuals, not some industry and we are here today to talk about individuals protected under the 
Constitution.”). 
 125 Urban Outfitters Responds to False Allegations by Necklace Designer, supra note 115; see 
also Kamer, supra note 114. 
 126 Nicki Minaj Accused of Copying Fashion Designer Styles, URBAN HOT RADIO (Sept. 23, 
2011), www.urbanhotradio.com/2011/09/23/nicki-minaj-accused-of-copying-fashion-designers-
styles/. 
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positive note, publicity now that their names and garments have received 
attention, albeit due to allegations of someone copying their designs.  
Nevertheless, a court is in the best position to determine the legal rights 
of the parties and what remedies, if any, should be afforded. 
II.  HISTORY OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AFFORD COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION TO FASHION DESIGN 
Congress has introduced seven bills in the last six years proposing 
to extend copyright protection to fashion design.127  Although the bills 
did not pass, the history reveals a steady growth in support among 
members in Congress and in the fashion industry, as well as lively 
political debate that has guided the drafters of later bills in 
accommodating advocates and opponents alike.128  Accordingly, the 
recent bills are more focused in protecting fashion designers while 
minimizing the claimed ramifications of enacting such laws. 
A. H.R. 5055, DESIGN PIRACY PROHIBITION ACTS, AND THE FIRST 
INNOVATIVE DESIGN PROTECTION AND PIRACY PREVENTION ACT 
In proposing the first bill, “A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion 
Design,” Representative Goodlatte recognized that existing intellectual 
property protections fall short of protecting the fashion designer, 
especially in light of the Internet: “[O]nce a design is made public, 
pirates can now virtually immediately offer an identical knockoff piece 
on the Internet for distribution.”129  This is troublesome for the new 
fashion designer because much of her or his promotion is through the 
Internet.130  The weakness of this bill, however, was that its language 
was broad, it did not define infringement in the case of fashion, and it 
required registration in order to obtain protection.131  The registration 
 127 A Bill To Provide Protection for Fashion Design, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006); Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2196, 
111th Cong. (2009); Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. 
(2010); Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Congress (2012). 
 128 See infra Subparts A, B. 
 129 See Hearing on H.R. 5055, supra note 18, at 4 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte). 
 130 See supra Part I.D. 
 131 Hearing on H.R. 5055, supra note 18, at 2 (statement the Honorable Lamar Smith, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property) (“Others have 
expressed concerns that the legislation is too broad and would prohibit the ability of designers and 
retailers to replicate current trends and styles, something on which the fashion industry thrives.”); id. 
at 87 (prepared statement of Christopher Sprigman, Associate Professor, University of Virginia 
School of Law) (“We fear that a primary effect of H.R. 5055 will be extensive and costly litigation 
18
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requirement was particularly problematic because the bill would have 
“require[d] the Register of Copyrights to determine whether or not the 
application relates to a design which on its face appears to be within the 
subject matter protected as original designs.”132  The bill never came to a 
vote in either house,133 but its introduction nonetheless started the 
ongoing debate over whether fashion design should be protected. 
The three bills introduced in the following three years were titled 
the Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA).134  These bills were virtually 
identical to the prior bill, with the exception that they defined 
infringement.135  Again, the bills were problematic because of their 
breadth and their requirement of registration.136  An additional concern 
was that the DPPA would permit infringement claims for designs that 
were “substantially similar” to the copyrighted design.137  Consequently, 
the bills never made it out of committee.  This is partially due to the 
ongoing legal and political debates over whether fashion design should 
be afforded copyright protection, and partially due to the fact that fashion 
industry organizations were themselves divided as to whether the DPPA 
was the proper path to affording copyright protection to fashion 
design.138 
With the introduction of the first ID3PA in 2010, major players 
within the fashion industry, namely Council of Fashion Designers of 
America and American Apparel and Footwear Association, who were at 
odds over the DPPA, came together to support the ID3PA.139  The 
ID3PA was considerably different from its predecessors.  First, it would 
 
over what constitutes infringement. As such, H.R. 5055 is a lawyer-employment bill, not a fashion-
industry protection bill.”). 
 132 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUMMARY, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006), available at 
www.thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR05055:@@@D&summ2=m&. 
 133 Xiao, supra note 60, at 433. 
 134 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1957, 110th Cong. 
(2007); H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Arielle K. Cohen, Designer Collaborations as a Solution to the Fast-Fashion Copyright 
Dilemma, 11 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. 172, 172 (2012) (“A number of versions of 
the Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA) have entered Congress and none have passed, largely due 
to some controversial provisions that were contained therein such as the registration requirement 
which would require designers to register their designs in order to receive protection.”). 
 137 See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, supra note 14, at 1217-20. 
 138 E.g., Design Law Hearing, supra note 16, at 61-62; see generally Hearing on H.R. 5055, 
supra note 18. 
 139 Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 1, at 91 (statement of Kurt Courtney, Manager, 
Government Relations, American Apparel & Footwear Association) (explaining that the AAFA 
“fundamentally disagreed with [prior bills to afford copyright to fashion design] overly broad 
definitions,” but is now working in conjunction with the CFDA in developing a more targeted bill in 
the ID3PA). 
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not have required registration to obtain protection; instead, a fashion 
design would have been protected as soon as it was first made public.140  
Second, the bill defined an infringing article as “substantially 
identical,”141 rather than “substantially similar.”142  The bill also included 
a home-sewing exception, which would have permitted an individual to 
produce a single copy of a protected garment for her or his own use or 
for that of an immediate family member.143  The ID3PA had more 
success than its predecessors, advancing to the Senate floor after being 
passed unanimously by the Senate Judiciary Committee.144  Again, the 
bill never came to a vote.145  Nevertheless, the relative success of the first 
ID3PA demonstrates the growing strength of the bill and the prospect of 
success in the future. 
B. THE NEW INNOVATIVE DESIGN PROTECTION AND PIRACY 
PREVENTION ACT AND THE INNOVATIVE DESIGN PROTECTION ACT 
OF 2012 
The 112th Congress proposed two separate bills that would afford 
copyright protection to fashion design.146  In 2011, the House of 
Representatives introduced the ID3PA, a replica of the first ID3PA 
introduced in the prior term.147  The Senate introduced the IDPA in 2012, 
a bill with much of the same language as the ID3PA, but with added 
limitations on the commencement of an action against an alleged 
infringer.148 At the conclusion of the 112th Congress, both bills failed to 
come to a vote; the ID3PA died in committee, while the IDPA died on 
the Senate floor, though it was reported favorably and without 
amendment by the Senate Judiciary Committee within ten days of 
receiving the bill.149 
Both the ID3PA and IDPA would have afforded copyright 
protection for a period of three years once a fashion design was made 
public.150  Fashion design would have been defined “as a whole of an 
 140 Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. § 2(e) 
(2010). 
 141 See, e.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. § 2(e) (2009). 
 142 S. 3728 § 2(e). 
 143 S. 3728 § 2(i). 
 144 GOVTRACK.US S. 3728, supra note 35. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Congress (2012). 
 147 H.R. 2511. 
 148 S. 3523. 
 149 GOVTRACK.US H.R. 2511, supra note 29; GOVTRACK.US S. 3523, supra note 29. 
 150 H.R. 2511 § 2(d); S. 3523 § 2(d). 
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article of apparel, including its ornamentation,”151 which “includes 
original elements of the article of apparel or the original arrangement or 
placement of original or non-original elements as incorporated in the 
overall appearance of the article of apparel that . . . are the result of a 
designer’s own creative endeavor”152 and “provide a unique, 
distinguishable non-trivial and non-utilitarian variation over prior 
designs for similar types of articles.”153  To sue for infringement, a 
plaintiff would be required to plead with particularity facts showing that 
the infringing article is “substantially identical in overall visual 
appearance,” and that the article is not the alleged infringer’s 
“independent creation.”154 
The IDPA, in contrast to the ID3PA, would provide additional 
limitations on copyright protections for fashion designers.155  The 
purported copyright holder would be required to provide written 
notification to the alleged infringer at least twenty-one days before 
commencing legal action.156  The twenty-one-day notification period, by 
itself, would not hinder new fashion designers from bringing suit.  What 
would hinder a new fashion designer from vindicating her or his rights is 
the IDPA’s limitation on damages.  The IDPA provides that “[a] person 
alleged to be undertaking action leading to infringement . . . shall be held 
liable only for damages and profits accrued after the date on which the 
action for infringement is commenced against such person.”157  Senator 
Schumer explained that these limitations were added in response to 
fashion organizations’ and congressional members’ fear of frivolous 
litigation.158  Four members of the Senate Judiciary Committee felt the 
bill did not do enough to limit litigation, and they proposed to amend the 
IDPA to include a “loser pays” provision that would require the losing 
party to pay the prevailing party’s reasonable attorneys’ fees.159  
However, as explained below, a fee-shifting statute is already in place,160 
which will sufficiently deter frivolous litigation.  Thus, the IDPA’s added 
limitations would only hurt new fashion designers who cannot seek relief 
for the damage already done prior to the notice period.  If the alleged 
infringer ceases her or his conduct, there is no longer a cause of action.  
 151 H.R. 2511 § 2(a)(2)(B); S. 3523 § 2(a)(2)(B). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id.  (emphasis added). 
 155 See S. 3523 § 2(e). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. (emphasis added). 
 158 Executive Business Meeting, supra note 28. 
 159 S. REP. NO. 112-259, at 10-11 (2012), available at 2012 WL 6725915 (Westlaw). 
 160 17 U.S.C.A. § 1323(d) (Westlaw 2012). 
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As Senator Dianne Feinstein put it, the bill protects “couture design.”161  
And while the bill protects one aspect of fashion, it easily ignores the 
needs of new fashion designers. 
III.  THE ID3PA IS BETTER SUITED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF NEW 
DESIGNERS AND WILL NOT INCREASE LITIGATION DUE TO A FEE-
SHIFTING STATUTE 
Adopting the ID3PA would remedy the potential threat of loss to 
the small businesses of new fashion designers, as well as better define 
new fashion designers’ legal rights.  The ID3PA provides legal 
protection and thus the ability to engage in legal action.162  For new 
designers who may lack funds to pursue legal action, Harvard Law 
Professor Jeanne Suk suggests law firms undertake cases on a 
contingent-fee basis, because “nothing in the [ID3PA] prohibits 
contingent fee arrangements.”163  Chapter 13 of the Copyright Act, 
“Protection of Original Designs,” also provides reasonable attorneys’ 
fees in the court’s discretion as a remedy for infringement.164  At the 
very least, adopting legislation like the ID3PA would provide new 
designers some legal recourse because protection exists at the time the 
fashion design is first made public.165  Opponents of the ID3PA and 
proposed legislation affording copyright protection to fashion designs 
contend that such legislation will result in a flood of litigation.166  This 
contention is based on speculation, with no persuasive suppor 167
Opponents argue that enactment would bring more, if not frivolous, 
litigation “simply because [the United States is] a more litigious 
society.”168  When the ID3PA was being considered in the 111th 
Congress, one congressional member raised concerns that the ID3PA 
 161 Executive Business Meeting, supra note 28. 
 162 See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
 163 Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Jeannie Suk, Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law School). 
 164 17 U.S.C.A. § 1323(d) (Westlaw 2012) (“In an action for infringement under this chapter, 
the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”). 
 165 H.R. 2511 § 2(g)(1). 
 166 See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 1, at 95 (statement of Christopher Sprigman, 
Professor of Law, University of Virginia). But see id. at 17-18 (statement of Jeannie Suk, Professor 
of Law, Harvard Law School) (stating that the concern that adopting ID3PA may see an increase in 
litigation is overstated); id. at 91 (statement of Kurt Courtney, Manager, Government Relations, 
American Apparel & Footwear Association) (stating that the ID3PA was written to be “a more 
targeted bill” that would protect fashion designers while not increasing litigation). 
 167 See, e.g., id. at 95 (statement of Christopher Sprigman, Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia). 
 168 Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 14, at 1743-44. 
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could yield “a flood of litigation” due to the absence of registration for 
copyright protection and possible ambiguity of the ID3PA language, 
namely the bill’s failure to define “substantially identical.”169  Professor 
Suk contends that this concern is overstated because the bill calls for 
particularized pleading, and “substantially identical” is a high bar to 
overcome.170  Furthermore, according to Professor Suk, there is a 
distinction between one who “close copies” or “line-by-line” copies 
another’s fashion design, which would constitute “substantially 
identical,” and one who is influenced by, pays homage to, or simply 
“remixes” or adapts another’s fashion design to create her or his own 
design.171  While the former ultimately harms innovation within the 
fashion industry, because “there is no reason to reject the standard 
justification for intellectual property, that permissive copying reduces 
incentives to create,” the latter may be “valuable to fashion 
innovation.”172  Moreover, the threat of awarding the prevailing party 
attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 1323(d) will halt excessive litigation. 
Commentators—proponents and opponents alike—ignore the 
established remedies for infringement under Chapter 13 of the Copyright 
Act.  Specifically, Chapter 13 permits attorneys’ fees to be awarded, at 
the court’s discretion, to the prevailing party.173  This remedy is 
particularly important because it creates a disincentive from filing suit 
due to the risk of being ordered to pay costly attorneys’ fees.  However, 
it is unclear what rule of law courts must follow in awarding fees to 
prevailing parties under Chapter 13, as there is little case law on the issue 
thus far. 
Only one case has considered Chapter 13’s fee-shifting statute, 17 
U.S.C. § 1323(d), since its enactment.  In Maverick Boat Co. v. 
American Marine Holdings, Inc., the district court granted attorneys’ fees 
to the prevailing defendants in a Vessel Hull Design Protection Act 
action, holding that § 1323(d) “does not require that the Court find the 
presence of bad faith or that the case is an exceptional one,” but that “the 
Court may find a party is a prevailing party where said party has been 
 169 Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Jeannie Suk, Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law School). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 40, at 1153 (“Design copying must be distinguished from 
other forms of relation between two designs, which may go by any number of names including 
inspiration, adaptation, homage, referencing, or remixing.”); see also Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra 
note 1, at 17 (statement of Jeannie Suk, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).  In The Piracy 
Paradox Revisited, Raustiala and Sprigman describe “close copying” as “line-by-line copying.”  See 
Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 14, at 1217. 
 172 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 40, at 1153. 
 173 17 U.S.C.A. § 1323(d) (Westlaw 2012). 
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awarded by the Court relief on the merits of at least some of its 
claims.”174  The district court suggested, however, that it had awarded 
fees based on plaintiff’s “careless conduct surrounding” its registered 
vessel hull design.175 
But the district court made no mention of the fee-shifting statute 
under the Copyright Act, nor did the court cite the Fogerty standard, 
which guides courts in awarding attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 in 
a copyright dispute.  In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,176 the United States 
Supreme Court rejected the dual standard for prevailing plaintiffs and 
prevailing defendants that applies under the Civil Rights Act of 1963 fee-
shifting statute.177  The Fogerty Court held that “[p]revailing plaintiffs 
and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike” when considering 
attorneys’ fees.178  Yet, in Maverick, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s ruling without considering the Copyright Act or 
Fogerty.179  While Chapter 13 of the Copyright Act provides sui generis 
protection and is therefore separate from the rest of the Copyright Act, it 
makes the most sense to conclude that § 1323(d) would follow 
established case law under § 505. 
In evaluating “prevailing party” under the Copyright Act, the 
Supreme Court in Fogerty adopted an even-handed standard: “Prevailing 
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike.”180  The Court 
rejected the dual standard that applies in civil-rights actions, under which 
a prevailing plaintiff “should ordinarily recover [attorneys’ fees] unless 
some special circumstances would render such an award unjust,”181 
while a prevailing defendant is to be awarded attorneys’ fees “upon a 
finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”182  The 
Court noted, “‘There is no precise rule or formula for making these 
determinations,’ but instead equitable discretion should be exercised ‘in 
light of the considerations we have identified.’”183  The Court also 
 174 Maverick Boat Co. v. Am. Marine Holdings, Inc., Nos. 02-14102-CIV, 02-14283-CIV, 
2004 WL 1093035, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2004), aff’d, 418 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
 177 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Westlaw 2012). 
 178 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534. 
 179 Maverick Boat Co. v. Am. Marine Holdings, Inc., 418 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 180 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534. 
 181 Id. at 522-23 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per 
curiam)). 
 182 Id. at 535 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978)). 
 183 Id. at 534 (majority opinion) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1983)) 
(emphasis added). 
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observed a number of nonexclusive factors a court should use when 
considering a claim for attorneys’ fees.184  Such factors include 
“frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the 
factual and in the legal components of the case) and the need in 
particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and 
deterrence.”185 
Several circuits have refined the Fogerty standard, finding 
presumptive entitlements under certain circumstances.  Circuit Judge 
Posner explained: 
If the case was a toss-up and the prevailing party obtained generous 
damages, or injunctive relief of substantial monetary value, there is no 
urgent need to add an award of attorneys’ fees.  But if at the other 
extreme the claim or defense was frivolous and the prevailing party 
obtained no relief at all, the case for awarding him attorneys’ fees is 
compelling.  As we said with reference to the situation in which the 
prevailing plaintiff obtains only a small award of damages, “the 
smaller the damages, provided there is a real, and especially a willful, 
infringement, the stronger the case for an award of attorneys’ fees . . . . 
[W]e go so far as to suggest, by way of refinement of the Fogerty 
standard, that the prevailing party in a copyright case in which the 
monetary stakes are small should have a presumptive entitlement to an 
award of attorneys’ fees.”  When the prevailing party is the defendant, 
who by definition receives not a small award but no award, the 
presumption in favor of awarding fees is very strong.  For without the 
prospect of such an award, the party might be forced into a nuisance 
settlement or deterred altogether from exercising his rights.186 
Judge Posner further explained the justification behind the attorney 
fee-shifting statute under the Copyright Act: if “a meritorious claim or 
defense is not lucrative, an award of attorneys’ fees may be necessary to 
enable the party possessing the meritorious claim or defense to press it to 
a successful conclusion rather than surrender it because the cost of 
vindication exceeds the private benefit to the party.”187  Thus, a new 
designer either has a lot to gain or a lot to lose in bringing suit against an 
alleged copyright infringer, because if the new designer brings suit and 
the meritorious defense is successful and the defendant is found to not 
have infringed, the new designer can be liable for attorneys’ fees. 
 184 Id. at 534 n.19. 
 185 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 186 Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 436-37 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted). 
 187 Id. at 437. 
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Upon a court’s determination that attorneys’ fees are proper, other 
considerations concerning the reasonableness of the award come into 
play.  A number of cases in the Second Circuit consider the financial 
strengths of the parties when deciding whether an award of attorneys’ 
fees is reasonable.188  For a court to consider denying attorneys’ fees 
under the Copyright Act, the party claiming financial disparity must 
provide evidence that the party will in fact suffer financial ruin.189  
Hence, a new fashion designer wishing to pursue legal action against a 
person or entity who has infringed will have the ability to bring a claim 
even if the defendant has a successful defense. 
The objective of the Copyright Act’s attorney fee-shifting remedy 
“is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical 
expression for the good of the public.”190 When an imposition of 
attorneys’ fees “would not promote the objectives of the Copyright Act,” 
a court may nevertheless, in its discretion, deny attorneys’ fees.191  
Therefore, new fashion designers can assert their legal rights without the 
fear of attorneys’ fees looming overhead. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, a new fashion designer has no recourse when a person or 
entity blatantly copies the designer’s clothing.192  However, if Congress 
adopts legislation like the ID3PA to afford copyright protection for 
fashion designs, new fashion designers will be granted copyright 
protection over their designs that are “the result of a designer’s own 
creative endeavor; and provide a unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and 
non-utilitarian variation over prior designs for similar types of 
articles.”   By affording new fashion designers copyright protection 
under Chapter 13 of the Copyright Act, these designers can create their 
own designs and assist in the innovation process in the fashion industry 
as a whole.  Without it, new designers may rethink their futures in the 
fashion industry and slowly withdraw from the industry.  Although the 
193
 188 Contractual Obligation Prods., LLC. v. AMC Networks, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 120, 132 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Brown v. Perdue, No. 04 Civ. 7417 (GBD), 2006 WL 2679936, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 15, 2006); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 94 Civ. 9144 (LAP), 2000 WL 
1010830, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2000); Littel v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., No. 89 Civ. 
8526 (DLC), 1996 WL 18819, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1996). 
 189 Brown, 2006 WL 2679936, at *6-7. 
 190 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 524. 
 191 Brown, 2006 WL 2679936, at *7. 
 192 See supra Part I.D. 
 193 Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2) 
(2011). 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/6
2013] ID3PA 353 
fashion industry thrives today, without new designers, the creativity 
essential to the fashion world could very well decline. 
The ID3PA provides ample opportunity for new fashion designers 
to assert their legal rights, unlike the IDPA, with its notice requirement.  
With a fee-shifting statute and the possibility of contingent-fee-based 
representation, new fashion designers can bring suit in order to define 
their legal rights without the threat of devastating costs.  In any event, 
legislation that affords new fashion designers copyright protection should 
be adopted in order to keep the new designer in the fashion industry. 
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